


Cover of *Die graphischen Künste* 22 (1899), which includes Alois Riegl, "Die Stimmung als Inhalt der modernen Kunst" (Mood as the Content of Modern Art). Digital Library Heidelberg. © Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg.



Mood for Modernists: An Introduction to Three Riegl Translations

LUCIA ALLAIS AND ANDREI POP

Despite leading a multifaceted career—as scholar of painting, ornament, and architecture, museum curator, and monuments inspector—Alois Riegl (1858–1905) is today a key reference in several scholarly fields, but not across them. In art history, Riegl is firmly ensconced as the founder of the Vienna School of formalist analysis. His legacy in tracing deep-seated visual structures extends far beyond the work done in Vienna by controversial followers, notably Max Dvořák, Hans Sedlmayr, and Otto Pächt; it also informed the philological iconology of Aby Warburg’s Hamburg School, various postwar efforts to found an “image science” (*Bildwissenschaft*), and the recent push for a global history of visibility drawing on formal as well as cultural, material, and economic resources.¹ At the same time, Riegl’s late writings as a monuments official and theorist of commemoration for the Austro-Hungarian Empire have made him a forerunner of postmodern memory studies (with their interest in pluralistic modes of accessing the past), as well as a foundational figure in contemporary conservation practice (where a Rieglian “values approach” has been a global standard since the 1970s).² Many media theorists are also indebted to Riegl’s work: some by way of Walter Benjamin’s own sustained Rieglian engagements in the 1930s (as he was writing his history of photography and theorizing art’s technological reproducibility); others through the “logic of sense” that Gilles Deleuze unfolded from Riegl’s speculation on “haptic” modes of visual perception.³


To bridge between these separate readerships—the art-historical, the conservationist, and the media-technical—a dossier of three Riegl translations is presented in this issue of *Grey Room*. United by his concept of mood (*Stimmung*), they are concise texts, central to Riegl’s reputation, but they have remained unavailable in English despite a growing (if unsystematic) corpus of Riegl translations.⁴ All three texts directly address his contemporaries’ aesthetic sensibilities and do so across a range of media from painting to masonry to magazine illustration. We hope they will help shift the emphasis in scholarly debates from feuding over neologisms (*Kunstwollen* above all) that have rigidified Riegl’s

reputation to considering his concepts in relation to the practical, technical, and political concerns that were already clear to him.⁵

The first text, “Mood as the Content of Modern Art,” is one of Riegl’s most celebrated. It appeared in 1899 in *Die graphischen Künste*, a high-end publication devoted to art prints and sponsored by a private collecting group evocatively named the Society for Replicable Art (Gesellschaft für vervielfältigende Kunst). Contemplating how to interpret the work of a circle of German and Austrian painters that he loosely called “impressionist,” Riegl argued that their work satisfied a uniquely modern craving for “mood”—by which he meant “an attribute of art objects” no less than “a disposition of the viewing public.” Strikingly, the text begins with a viewing not of art but of nature, as a mountain climber is staring into the distance amid sauntering goats. Only after this fictional opening gambit does Riegl plunge into a grand three-part narrative of the history of humankind, where art arises out of a succession of “worldviews.” The “art of mood,” he explains, was born in a *longue-durée* shift from theological modes of explanation to those centered on humans, and framed by laws of nature. The effect is undeniably Hegelian. But Riegl pivots from storytelling to interpretation with a scientific pronouncement—“We now know that a law of causality [*Kausalitätsgesetz*] pervades all of Creation”—that also evokes discussions of causal law and its unavailability to empirical verification, topics that were crucial during a later shift from providential to probabilistic modes of thinking in the late nineteenth century.⁶ In closing, Riegl refers to the slew of new sciences that had arisen as a result of this shift, each hoping to establish new principles with the infallibility of law. Elsewhere Riegl was elaborating new laws both interpretive (establishing art history as “positivistic” science) and bureaucratic (prescribing a “universalist” tutelage over art objects). But the “Mood” text draws more casually and speculatively from the lexicon of these “new disciplines” to argue simply that modernity is defined by the new role played by *knowledge* in mental life.⁷ Thus Riegl used the “Mood” text to anchor his critical assessment of modern art in an aesthetic schema he had been elaborating through his lectures on ancient art at

Below: Max Klinger. *Am Meer* (By the sea), from *Intermezzi*, *Opus IV* (1881).

Opposite: Front page of *Neue Freie Presse* 13,448 (1 February 1902), which includes Alois Riegl, “Das Riesenthor zu St. Stephan” (The Giant’s Door of St. Stephen’s).



the University of Vienna, culminating in the publication of *The Late Roman Art Industry* in 1901. The ornate prose of “Mood as the Content of Modern Art,” although presaging the final chapter of the celebrated 1901 monograph, sits equally well among the flowery prints and effusive artist appreciations of a lavish print magazine.

We publish the “Mood” text alongside two others in which Riegl put the concept of mood to more practical use. This is in part to show that the theoretical payoff of having established mood as a concept in the visual arts came as Riegl pushed his innovative methodological project increasingly toward questions of art’s reception. Both texts concern monument conservation, an area into which Riegl threw himself with particular energy in the final phase of his career.

The second text we have included, Riegl’s 1901 exegesis of the “Giant’s Door” (*Riesenthor*) of St. Stephen’s Cathedral (Stephansdom) in Vienna, was published as an op-ed in the daily newspaper *Neue Freie Presse* with the deceptively straightforward title “The Giant’s Door of St. Stephen’s.”⁸ It recounts a heated conflict among artists and architects that had first flared up in the 1870s around Vienna’s most recognizable artistic and religious institution. At stake were a Romanesque entrance portal and the Gothic protruding porch that covered and obscured it, with some bent on removing the Gothic accretion, others on allowing the object to continue as history had left it. Riegl’s article has achieved the status of a prototype: the first exemplary demonstration of a new method for adjudicating conservation disputes that he would treat more systematically one year later in “The Modern Cult of Monuments.”⁹ Rather than trying to align styles with ideologies or prescribe ideal reconstructions, Riegl’s method consists in abstracting from historical objects their varying capacity to satisfy a catalogue of modern “values,” often contradictory but all equally legitimate for the public interest, and then asking for

a compromise to achieve the greatest possible consensus. But whereas this system of arbitration is described in the 1903 “Cult” manifesto in detached, authoritative language suited to the establishment of a new monument law, the “Giant’s Door” article is both coolheaded *and* engaged. Riegl’s own experience as a student serves as an opening vignette. He then proceeds to show with great empathy that differing political motivations do not necessarily align with differences in modes of seeing and that mood created strange alliances among contemporaries: Secessionist painters, Viennese architects, students and professors of art history, supporters of John




Ruskin, “the Crown itself,” and many others. By threading into a single story line the moods of the many parties involved (including his own), Riegl’s intervention is held to have quieted passions and effectively ended the controversy.¹⁰

Rounding out our translation package is a third text, “The Restoration of the Wall Paintings in the Holy Cross Chapel of the Wawel Cathedral in Kraków.” Written in 1904, it was published as an official report in the imperial organ for preservation, the *Mitteilungen der k. k. Zentral-Kommission für Erforschung und Erhaltung der Kunst- und historischen Denkmale*, after Riegl had become a monuments commissioner and thus an employee of the government office charged with religion and education.¹¹ The Habsburg regime had just returned the massive multipurpose Wawel castle complex to local control, and Riegl was sent to inspect the decaying murals in the last room that remained to be restored. The report is steady (if not plodding) in its pace, largely because Riegl is obliged to refer to all forms of evidence available to him as a bureaucrat: written reports from painters, published historical accounts, chemical analyses of paint, photographs, as well as his own on-site observations. He ultimately recommends that the murals be mostly left alone—probably a foregone conclusion for the readers of the commission’s professional journal, many of whom would have heard Riegl’s programmatic 1903 lecture “On the Question of the Restoration of Mural Paintings” (or read its published transcript), in which he made an impassioned call against the tendency of painters to “renovate” medieval churches across the Empire by overpainting their murals.¹² But as usual with Riegl, the case study brings in historical and technical challenges not contained in any manifesto: the devil is in the details. His main discovery at Wawel was that, in the sixteenth century, a Western-trained restorer must have been

Below: Giant’s Door, St. Stephen’s Cathedral, Vienna, ca. 1230–1240. Photograph by Joseph Wlha, 1880s.

Opposite, top: Cover of *Mitteilungen der k. k. Zentral-Kommission für Erforschung und Erhaltung der Kunst- und historischen Denkmale* (July–September 1904), which includes Alois Riegl, “Die Restaurierung der Wandmalereien in der Heiligkreuzkapelle des Domes auf dem Wawel zu Krakau” (The Restoration of the Wall Paintings in the Holy Cross Chapel of the Wawel Cathedral in Kraków).

Opposite, bottom: Wawel Castle, Kraków, eleventh to seventeenth centuries. Postcard, 1899.




replaced by a more technically advanced “specialist” from Russia, revealing the most ancient layer of paint to be itself a restoration. The painstaking effort he expends to “discriminate between [the] distinct hands” that painted the chapel—and deliver an accurate “distribution of hands” for the historical record—echoes the way he used the hand in *The Group Portraiture of Holland* a year earlier to theorize how painting technique, science as subject matter, and reception through attentiveness coalesced under court patronage in the seventeenth century.¹³ Not only did Riegl the bureaucrat insert into his report a call, as a critic, for the preservation of all layers of this dizzyingly complex fresco cycle; he also saw in his Wawel assignment an opportunity, as a historian, to explore in exquisite detail the estranging visual effects that were produced over centuries, by innumerable hands, across a shifting East-West divide in training and taste.

Reading these three texts together allows us, as we reflect on the Rieglian debt in aesthetic discourse today, to see how Rieglian ideas interacted with particular discursive constraints. We see Riegl traveling to see and argue for artworks on site.¹⁴ We hear Riegl adopting markedly different tones, in different publishing venues, to describe works as diverse as prints after paintings on canvas, figures sculpted in stone, and frescoes of gold leaf and tempera. We find him reflecting on the relationship between art’s production and its reproduction, and searching for heuristics that will help weigh the mutual dependence of art, science, and religion. Throughout, we witness Riegl making deliberate terminological choices meant to resonate with the general audience to which he was responsible as public servant and intellectual. The remainder of our introduction, then, lays out the issues involved in producing translations that are both fresh and precise, and offers through lines for tracking three Riegl-associated sets of concepts across these texts: mood, sight and touch, and cult.

Mood across Media

As a concept, *Stimmung* was already on the ascendancy on the Viennese cultural scene when Riegl chose to center his appreciation of “impressionism” around it. Soon others joined in.



When the poet Hugo von Hofmannsthal published his so-called Chandos letter in 1902, he used the word *Stimmung* to name that ineffable quality of experience that might make a voluble poet fall silent.¹⁵ Riegl's text is more concerned with visual art, but it, too, has a literary density (a wordiness, to the unsympathetic) that makes it stand out in his oeuvre for the abstract difficulty of its ideas and the sensuous mode of its expression. Perhaps this quality of the essay has migrated to its key term: Anglophone historiography tends to emphasize the difficulty and untranslatability of *Stimmung*, which has weighty philosophical overtones. The philologist Leo Spitzer drew its pedigree from the ancient Greek notion of cosmic harmony (*Stimmung* also means musical tuning), and more recent Germanists have traced its evolution in phenomenology and the physiological aesthetics of the fin de siècle.¹⁶ But rich as its connotations are, *Stimmung* as *mood* is an everyday German word used to describe everything from putting someone in good spirits (*fröhlich stimmen*) to the typical valence of certain events (*Aufbruchstimmung*, meaning something like "a sense of limitless possibilities"). No wonder Martin Heidegger wrote that it challenges the distinction between the objective and the subjective.¹⁷ Yet it does so in a way that, however theoretically remote its sources, is direct and familiar in its effects. What Riegl proposed in his title as "the content of modern art" was not mystery *as such*. For him, what was mysterious and needed explanation was how *Stimmung* came to be the principal content of an art once concerned more with concrete cosmological or political realities. We have therefore decided not to leave *Stimmung* untranslated and instead chose *mood* as the more subjective but ordinary English term, fully aware that Riegl diagnosed modernity as the rise of subjectivity in representation and that, in English as in German, *mood* has analogues in *atmosphere* as well as *ambiance*, *harmony*, and other aesthetic and scientific terms.

Riegl's claim that mood is art's "content" was an undeniable affront to the dominant iconographic method of art-historical analysis. "It is not at all about subject-matter," he warns. Yet Riegl did not oppose content to form. He thought of both as essentially about the force and effect of objects on their human makers and viewers. This approach recalls a nascent modernist aesthetic of flow, such as Rainer Maria Rilke would articulate a few years later in observing that Auguste Rodin's work treats all of visible reality as one continuous surface.¹⁸ This aesthetic is a useful guide for what Riegl chooses to designate as "Modern art": aside from the German and Austrian painters he actually names, he mentions "red trees or green horses" (in "Mood")—perhaps thinking of the symbolist color of an Odilon Redon—and Secessionist painters using paints as "colored stimulants for thought" (in "Giant's Door"). In contrast, the

mural painter Izydor Jabłoński, who moonlighted as a restorer, is called “half-modern” (in “Restoration”), and the “flat plane” of the Giant’s Door is deemed less modern than a “richly sculpted one,” in clear contrast to the purist surfaces that would come to be seen as a distinguishing feature of modern architecture from the 1920s onward. Riegl can only conjecture about a future with “painterly architects and architectural painters”—a forecast perhaps fulfilled by Bruno Taut and the cubists and certainly raised to that level by Theo van Doesburg and Piet Mondrian.¹⁹ If mood “streams through” persons as much as patterns and images traverse the



history of art, this also explains Riegl's aloof, nearly automatic attitude toward the illustrations of the "Mood" article. He confidently bets that *any* set of contemporary images found "at random . . . in the editors' portfolio will bear out his theses on modern art just as well." In effect, he invites his reader to look not just through his article but at the pages beyond, to the issue of the magazine as a whole, and to previous issues, at the art that surrounds the reader, circa 1899.

This definition of content as something that "streams" across persons and things becomes more iconoclastic in "Giant's Door" and "Restoration," where mood displaces discussions of liturgical or religious content. In the first, we read how a mood-effect (*Stimmungswirkung*) is generated by the "life that streams out of old buildings . . . in the mind of the beholder"; in the latter, mood is "the comfortable sensation that streams through us" when we are conscious of "lingering in a building that is many centuries old." "Giant's Door" is also where Riegl first ascribes mood a value, *Stimmungswert*, to which he goes on to recommend cautious recourse in adjudicating restoration projects.²⁰ The two texts make subtle and even subversive play with mood, seeing in it the motivation both to renovate *and* to preserve and giving the word a rich set of permutations: a "mood effect" (*Stimmungswirkung*) is "emitted" by old buildings; art conveys an "impression of mood" (*Stimmungseindruck*); modern impressionists find their happiness in "mood-filled" (*stimmungsvoll*) Gothic architecture; devout Polish Catholics are a "modern mood-people" (*Stimmungsvolk*). This declension occurs every time Riegl wants to divert his readers from finding answers in art's iconography or even its function.

Much of the legacy of "Mood" lives on in Benjamin's definition of *aura* as that "strange weave of time and space, a unique appearance of a distance, no matter how close" that the work of art loses in the face of mechanical reproducibility.²¹ But if for Benjamin photography was "moodless" (*stimmungslos*), for Riegl, before any mass media are involved, a scientific mind-set has already imposed on the artist a logic of mechanistic reproduction, and mood is none the worse for it.²² The drift of his argument in the "Mood" text is that mood is better conveyed through landscape painting than through landscape itself. Thus painters do not imitate nature; they "reproduce an extract of their environs," as if they were naturalist atlas makers. In "Restoration" we even find the suggestion that the work of art itself is a kind of publication, one where the overpainters have transliterated the Cyrillic inscription of a painting in "modernized letters." More remarkable still is Riegl's willingness to keep a "distorted copy" rather than lose the original that lies behind it—a clear sign he thought restoration and reproduction had become inextric-

cably entwined in modernity. What reproducibility does offer for Riegl is a way out of hasty conclusions. In “Giant’s Door,” Riegl buys time by asking for not one but three acts of documentation: that the portal be further “published,” that its photographic record be consulted, and that its files (*Acten*) be completed.²³ In “Restoration,” Riegl asks for photographic reproductions “in dimensions corresponding to scientific needs.” The very fact that he was able to make such requests offers a clue to the important role played by technical imaging in the formalization of art history and its bureaucracy. The Imperial Commission had inaugurated its *Mittheilungen* (Communications) journal in 1884, and in 1907 the more systematic documentary *Kunsttopographie* would commence publication.

Riegl’s mentions of so many media and materialities across these three texts cautions us against taking him to mean that the effect of mood depends on spatial immersion, in the essentialist sense of space as an isotropic medium.²⁴ If the word *Stimmung* does have atmospheric, even “ecological” resonances, Riegl fine-tuned his theory of how the body participates in mood’s aesthetic reception by directing both its organs of sight and touch to a specific, surface-bound, and often screened-off, object.


Sight, Touch, and Twitch

Mood relies on a kind of visual touch: it “grasps phenomena with one look” and requires “only restfulness and far-sightedness” (in “Mood”); it “strip[s] things of their palpable corporeality” only to “reconstitute [them] through mental labor” (in “Giant’s Door”); and its effects are “forfeited” if “poignant” markings are “too carefully scrubbed-out” (in “Restoration”). Mood, then, gives insight into a distinction that is nearly as famous as that between *haptic* (or *tactile*) and *optic* modes of perception (sometimes considered Riegl’s great contribution to art history, akin to Heinrich Wölfflin’s linear/painterly pair): namely, between *nah-* and *fernsehen*, or “near” and “far” modes of seeing.²⁵ The former involves our tactile instincts and will to act; the latter encourages the sort of detached observation that brings about the triumph of mood. In translating these occurrences, we have used the English *nearsight* and *farsight*, *near-sighted* and *far-sighted*, keeping etymologically as close to the German as possible while avoiding confusion with the ophthalmological terms *nearsighted* and *farsighted* (*kurz-* and *weitsichtig*), which differ in German from Riegl’s words *nah-* and *fernsichtig*. Many of these words have contemporary valences: Riegl’s “farsight,” *fernsehen*, is the modern German word for television; “haptics” is what designers have named those effects our handheld digital devices make when they appear to “touch” us back.

The case against a too literal reading of touch in Riegl is best made in his “Giant’s Door” editorial, where the drama of near- and far-viewing that unfolds on a “lonely Alpine peak” in “Mood” is brought down to the streets of a bustling metropolis. There, the spatial grounds for aesthetic perception were quickly shifting. The very ability to stand “in front” of the Giant’s Door “as before every work of art,” was entirely novel at the time of his writing. Only in the 1880s, after urban planners enlarged the Stephansplatz, conjoining it with a nearby smaller square by demolishing a picturesque streetscape that had once framed its view, was it possible to face the portal *in two ways*: very near, crowding the portal’s gate, or as far back as a hundred meters to the west. Also novel about this stance is that it allowed comparison. After all, as Riegl implies, a scholar could at any moment deambulate to another nearby Gothic church, the tiny, exquisite Maria am Gestade (Maria on the Shore), distracted by the thought that there might be a better explanation for the portal there. This is a haptic event: the bodily urge to walk away is provoked by nothing more than the visual impediment of the Gothic arch, and this same twitch leads the less erudite passerby to demand, like the hunter in “Mood” reaching for his rifle, “Away with the obstacle!”

With its enlarged viewing space, the gothic portal becomes more of a screen, barely more substantial than the layers of paint that are the subject of Riegl’s extensive detective work in the Holy Cross Chapel in Kraków. Here, too, mood is a surface-bound phenomenon, but one so powerful that it forces viewers to reposition themselves simply by perceiving different image layers that are mere millimeters apart. If Riegl decries that the gold leaf has been improperly laid only *around* saints’ heads instead of beneath them—for instance, “disfiguring them into flat silhouettes, as if cut-out”—the “crime” is that the painter has violated the structural dynamic of near- and far-seeing in Byzantine art: robbing the saints of the golden underglow that would make them suitable for far-seeing and imposing on them a too haptic nearness instead.

Near- and far-seeing have methodological uses too. All three texts set



the stage for the coolheaded, “restful,” modern critic and bureaucrat, the one who is “close enough” but also “sufficiently detached” and who combines intimate knowledge with overall insight, the latter clearly being more important. “Going into questions of detail,” Riegl writes at the end of “Giant’s Door,” “has been strictly avoided, so that the key questions could be more sharply highlighted in their full significance.” Yet among the questions strategically omitted for Riegl’s audience are large-scale historical ones, such as the question of *why* St. Stephen’s Gothic addition was built at all. After dismissing all available interpretations one by one (to unify style; to reinforce the structure; to hide fire damage), Riegl reveals that there was a “propensity to enclose” cathedrals in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. But he refuses to discuss the “cause” of this tendency, mentioning only the precedent of St. Peter’s in Rome. The specialist reader would have known that behind this passing mention of Saint Peter’s lies Riegl’s entire revisionist interpretation of the architecture of late antiquity, where the plan and form of the Christian basilica evolved not due to its specific function as a church but as a development in the history of the perception of space, directionality, and enclosure.²⁶ If Riegl avoids taking newspaper readers down this detour, it is no doubt to avoid upsetting their assumptions that church architecture develops directly out of patronage and liturgical function. That is, to “get into questions of detail” would have forced Riegl to broach his controversial views of a topic he never mentions in “Giant’s Door” but that is pervasive in the other two texts: cult.

Cult and Its Contradictions

“Mood and devotion live close to one another,” Riegl observes at the end of the 1899 text, “for devotion is nothing but religious mood.” Our three texts thus help understand one of Riegl’s most distinct appropriations of an imperial word: *Kultus*. A major obstacle in translating and understanding *Kultus* in English is the overwhelmingly negative connotations of the word *cult* in contemporary American usage, where it implies either coerced membership in a sect or a product of mass culture (“as in cult movie,” as Foster and Girardo put it).²⁷ But the word *Kultus* has a more straightforward meaning too; it designates the administration of organized religion by modern states, in particular nineteenth-century France, Germany, and Austria (where the term is still in use).²⁸ Riegl himself was an employee of the Ministry of Cult and Education (Kultus und Unterrichtsministerium). We have translated *Kultus* as *cult* where the popular association seems predominant, and as “religious observance” where the relevant social practice and its political function is in play. The negative valence of *cult* in English is only a symptom of a

View of St. Stephen’s Cathedral and of the Lazanskyhaus, which was demolished in 1896 to enlarge the Stefansplatz, Vienna. Photograph, 1874. Bildarchiv Österreichische Nationalbibliothek.

deeper epistemic problem on which Riegl himself is a helpful commentator: the widespread belief that we live in secular times, with religion becoming a marginal concern. Riegl's view is far more complex. His analysis of cult is not of a phenomenon in decline. He insisted that the rise of a "natural-scientific" worldview "did not result in the elimination of faith" and that "[i]t would be a mistake to see a contradiction" between art and religion, since they "go hand in hand." The "solace-seeking race of our time" needs salvation, but all that art can bring is "relief." Thus, whatever other parts of Riegl's "world machinery" abide by a Hegelian telos, in this one aspect he jettisoned synthesis. There is no dialectic here, no stated compensatory dynamic between mood and cult or art and religion. Instead, Riegl uses the capaciousness of the word *cult* to describe *several* ways that art's production and reception are affected by religion in "spiritually deeply excited times."

First and foremost, cult in Riegl's work appears as an institutional force. The remarkable "rejuvenation" of the Catholic Church, whose membership in German-speaking countries peaked around 1880, was part of a generalized growth of institutions in nineteenth-century Europe.²⁹ Deference to the political power of churches obtained even when the number of believers waned. The Wawel chapel remained a "consecrated space" despite the dearth of Orthodox Russian practitioners in Poland, and Riegl speculated that the unexpected return of taste for this medieval wall-based medium was produced by the joining of the forces of religiosity and nationalism. In his lectures on the Baroque, Riegl similarly pointed to the return of Catholicism during the Counter-Reformation as a force behind the "bombastic manner" of the Baroque revival. But if Catholicism in sixteenth-century Rome brought with it "religious intolerance," as Riegl admitted in his historical lectures on the Roman Baroque, in fin de siècle Vienna all modes of religious observance earned power, regardless of confession—to the point of approaching "pantheism."³⁰ The Gothic porch of the Giant's Door performs a kind

Right: Corpus Christi procession, Graben, Vienna, ca. 1910. Photographer unknown.


Opposite: "Entstehung des Blitzes II: Einfluss des Grundwassers" (The origins of lightning II: The flow of groundwater). Wall poster from Prof C[arl] Bopps *Wandtafeln für Naturlehre*. (Elektrizität), Stuttgart, ca. 1880.



of institutional *Dasein* when Riegl writes that it “represents” the current state of the cathedral by using a word, *repräsentieren*, that does not mean to depict visually or verbally (*darstellen*), nor to represent in a parliamentary sense (*vertreten*); rather, it refers to a feudal political practice where the prince represents himself *as* the state, as in Louis XIV’s absolutist declaration, “l’état, c’est moi.”³¹

Riegl also used the word *cult* in a second way, however: to critique orthodoxy, rule following, or, as he writes in “Giant’s Door,” being “more popish than the pope.” This applies especially to critics and artists who seem slavishly devoted to the “authenticity” and “purity” of style, obeying not an actual church-imposed rule but an acculturation. In effect, Riegl suggests that in its modern form this cult of authenticity is but a pious distortion of the scientific ethos. In 1901 Riegl used the term *cult* pejoratively to poke fun at the Young Semperians, who practiced the “cult of isolated facts,” misunderstanding the natural-scientific worldview to mean that “tool or technique” took precedence in an artist’s struggle with the material substrate of art.³² For Riegl, cultishness and rule following were given new relevance by the march of technology. His example, in “Mood,” was the lightning rod. Used by both the faithful and by unbelievers, it was a sign of changed attitudes toward nature but not a technique with world-historical meaning per se. The intermixing of technique and belief are most fully explored in “Restoration,” where Riegl recasts the entire history of conservation as a history of technical choices made in the name of faithfulness: at first, to repaint figures and not backgrounds; then, to redraw lines and leave color alone. The only evidence that Riegl presents to support his argument that the Russian “specialist” whose existence he has uncovered was certifiably under the “powerful effect of the East” lies in the “particularly soulful” way he painted. Cult here is practice, not ideology.

A third valence to *cult* is associated with inner spiritual life, which Riegl deploys every time he discusses “the cult of age” as arising with



the Protestant Reformation, that “tremendous movement of spirits” that brought with it a disdain of church hierarchies and collective ritual. As recent revisionist literature on the secularization thesis shows, and as Riegl already emphasized, the pressure to adopt this more inward form of faith, and the desire for personal, experiential connection with the sacred texts of revealed religion, affected Catholicism too.³³ To accommodate this multisectarianism, Riegl paints the history of Christianity in broad strokes in “Mood,” even veering toward dematerialization: already in the late Middle Ages, he argues, people believed in “one single, morally strong God without any physical substance, pure spirit.” At stake in the question of whether this early modern, overarching “Christian God” is dematerialized was no less than a debate about the relative influence of East and West in establishing a modern definition of the material substrate of art. Many disagreed with Riegl about religious art, especially on gold and its relation to cult. In 1932, Josef Bodonyi argued that gold leaf represented light, sacredness, and the Augustinian theological idea of “irradiation”—that is, that gold was Christian religious mystery incarnate.³⁴ On the other hand, students of Riegl’s nemesis Josef Strzygowski labeled the gold of Eastern art a “pure abstraction,” so incommensurate with the West that it could never be subsumed into a history of Christianity.³⁵ Riegl, hoping to strike an intermediate position, theorized the advent of gold ground as the invention of an alternate way to make space: analogous to the perspectival construction of the Renaissance, it allowed patrons of religious art to avoid “more earthly accoutrements.”³⁶ This Western-style ecumenism is a precondition for accepting Riegl’s appropriation of the term *cult* to designate modern aesthetic experience.

Riegl’s experience at the Wawel is a good place to end because it ultimately resembles that of a reader revisiting his writings afresh today. Some concepts ring with apparent contemporaneity; others have been so transformed by later theorists that Riegl’s own usage seems antiquated, and few can avoid conjuring one historiographic debate or another. Riegl’s work itself has been continually evaluated as if it were a contribution to that soothing feeling of causal closure that he diagnosed as the hidden source of mood. What one expects from Riegl is a historiographic picture where everything fits together: the work of the scholar, the modern art around him, the moods of people, even the laws surrounding art. Yet Riegl, for all his generalizing efforts, was uneasy about this completeness. His attention to counterintuitive details is one of his greatest legacies.



Gustav Klimt. *Die Poesie*
(Poetry), detail of the right
wall of the *Beethovenfries*
(Beethoven frieze), Secession
Building, Vienna, 1902.

Notes

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1. Instead of reproducing a vast bibliography, suffice it here to point to Sedlmayr's and Pächt's early and late evaluations of Riegl's impact: Hans Sedlmayr, "Die Quintessenz der Lehren Riegls," in Alois Riegl, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, ed. Karl Swoboda and Hans Sedlmayr (Augsburg and Vienna: B. Filser, 1929), xxii–xxxii, available in English as "The Quintessence of Riegl's Thought," in *Framing Formalism: Riegl's Work*, ed. Richard Woodfield (London: Routledge, 2001), 11–32; and Otto Pächt, "Art Historians and Art Critics, VI: Alois Riegl," *Burlington Magazine* 105, no. 722 (May 1963): 188–93, reprinted in German in Otto Pächt, *Methodisches zur kunsthistorischen Praxis* (Munich: Prestel, 1977), 141–52. Both were reacting at least in part to the critical revaluating of Riegl in Erwin Panofsky, "Der Begriff des Kunstwollens" (1920), available in English as "The Concept of Artistic Volition," trans. Kenneth J. Northcott and Joel Snyder, *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 1 (Autumn 1981): 17–33. Later meditations on Riegl's place in art history include Henri Zerner, "Alois Riegl: Art, Value, and Historicism," *Daedalus* 105, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 177–88; Margaret Olin, *Forms of Representation in Alois Riegl's Theory of Art* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992); Jaś Elsner, "From Empirical Evidence to the Big Picture: Some Reflections on Riegl's Concept of Kunstwollen," *Critical Inquiry* 32, no. 4 (Summer 2006): 741–66; and Christopher Wood, "Riegl's *make*," *Res* 46 (Autumn 2004): 154–72.

2. On Riegl's influence on twentieth-century monuments debates, see Lucia Allais, *Designs of Destruction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 16–18. For memory discourse, see Mechtild Widrich, "The Willed and the Unwilled Monument: Judenplatz Vienna and Riegl's *Denkmalpflege*," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 72, no. 3 (September 2013): 382–98. In art history, many memory scholars are also Riegl scholars. See *Monuments Made and Unmade*, ed. Robert S. Nelson and Margaret Olin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 1–2. While in architectural history Riegl is an obligatory reference for anyone commenting on monuments, historiographic investment tends to be low. See Alan Colquhoun, "Newness and Age Value in Riegl," *Modernity and the Classical Tradition* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 213–21; Mark Wigley, "The Architectural Cult of Synchronization," *Journal of Architecture* 4, no. 4 (1999): 409–35; Thordis Arrhenius, "The Cult of Age in Mass Society," *Future Anterior* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 74–80; and Mario Carpo, "The Postmodern Cult of Monuments," *Future Anterior* 4, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 51–60.

3. In 1933 Benjamin reviewed the first volume of the Vienna School's *Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen*. See Walter Benjamin, "Rigorous Study of Art," trans. Thomas Y. Levin, *October* 47 (Winter 1988): esp. 85 n. 3, 87–88. Benjamin was attracted to Riegl's *Late Roman Art Industry* and *The Group Portraiture of Holland*. He continued this interpretation in "A Little History of Photography" and "Work of Art in the Age of Its Technical Reproducibility," a description of "aura" whose decline was a precondition to the rise of modern art, which draws from Riegl's *Stimmung*. See Walter Benjamin, *The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility and Other Writings on Media*, ed. Michael Jennings, Brigid Doherty, and Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). See also Antonio Somaini, "Walter Benjamin's Media Theory: The Medium and the Apparatus," *Grey Room* 62 (Winter 2016): 6–41. On Riegl's use of the

word *haptic* for a tactile sense not opposed to vision, as well as the term's origins and later use, see David Parisi, *Archaeologies of Touch* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2018), 34–36; and Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: La logique du sens* (1969), available in English as *The Logic of Sensation*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (New York: Continuum, 2003).

4. Besides classic monographs such as *Problems of Style*, *The Late Roman Art Industry*, and *The Group Portraiture of Holland*, lecture series such as *Baroque Art in Rome* and *A Historical Grammar of Art* have been posthumously released in English. More casual contributions such as the book review of an art-theoretical manifesto by French Salpêtrière doctor Denis Richer, “Objective Aesthetics,” are now available too. See *Problems of Style: Foundations for a History of Ornament* (1893), trans. Evelyn Kain (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); *The Late Roman Art Industry* (1901), trans. Rolf Winkes (Rome: Giorgio Bretschneider, 1985); *The Group Portraiture of Holland*, trans. Evelyn M. Kain and David Britt (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 1999); *The Origins of Baroque Art in Rome* (1905), trans. Andrew Hopkins and Arnold Witte (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2010); *Historical Grammar of the Visual Arts*, trans. Jacqueline Jung (New York: Zone, 2004); and Karl R. Johns, “Riegl and ‘Objective Aesthetics,’” *Journal of Art Historiography*, no. 11 (December 2014), <https://arthistoriography.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/johns-riegl-translation.pdf>. On the significance of the history of modernity Riegl sketches in this review and in the text on mood, see Andrei Pop, *A Forest of Symbols: Art, Science and Truth in the Long Nineteenth Century* (New York: Zone Books, 2019), 112–13, 148–49.

5. Careful attempts have been made to capture the nuance of the German infinitive *wollen*. Pächt preferred “willing” to Ernst Gombrich’s tendentious “will to art.” Pächt, “Art Historians and Art Critics, VI,” 190. The English *gerund*, however, suggests constant activity rather than an abstract and subsistent will. Christopher Wood, *A History of Art History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), uses the unpretentious “art-will.” Sedlmayr (“Quintessenz,” xvii) suggested that Riegl used the term *instead of* “style” in his art-historical writings. In his writings for a general audience, such as the three here translated, Riegl reverts to *style*, with one dramatic exception in “Restoration,” written for fellow conservationists, where he uses both *Kunstwollen* and *style*. As in Northcott and Snyder’s Panofsky translation, we use “artistic volition” to capture the fact that the original, while a neologism, is intelligible and not at all grammatically suspect in German.

6. Gerd Gigerenzer, *The Empire of Chance* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 37–58; and Theodore Porter, *The Rise of Statistical Thinking* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).

7. Riegl invokes the “Great Chain of Being,” a concept that enjoyed a resurgence in the biological monism of Ernst Haeckel. See Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936); and Ernst Haeckel, *Die Welträthsel* (Bonn: Emil Strauß, 1899), available in English as *The Riddle of the Universe at the Close of the Nineteenth Century*, trans. Joseph McCabe (New York: Harper, 1905).

8. “Das Riesenthor” is the common name for the Western Portal of St. Stephen’s Cathedral. Until the controversy, the name referred more strictly to the interior Romanesque door opening and not to the Gothic protruding porch. For example, in 1846 the architect Leopold Oescher described his hand sketch as a view of the Giant’s Door as seen “through” the Gothic arch. Leopold Oescher, “Ansicht des Riesenthores durch den Spitzbogen des Vorbaus” (1846). Older English-language literature usually renders it as the “Giant’s Door,” referring to the mythical origin of the German name: a bone thought

to belong to a giant, probably in fact to a mammoth, was dug up on the site and hung on the Gothic entrance, perhaps in 1443. See Paul Kortz, ed., *Wien am Anfang des XX. Jahrhunderts: Ein Führer in technischer und künstlerischer Richtung*, vol. 1 (Vienna: Gerlach und Wiedling, 1905), 26–27; and Renata Kassal-Mikula, *850 Jahre St. Stephan: Symbol und Mitte in Wien 1147–1997* (Vienna: Museen der Stadt Wien, 1997), 475. Recent Riegl translations opt for “Giant Portal,” which unfortunately implies the portal itself is gigantic. We have used the capitalized expression “Giant’s Door” when Riegl uses *Riesenthor*; otherwise we use *portal*, *door*, *gate*, and *porch* as best suited for clarity.

9. Alois Riegl, *Das Moderne Denkmalkultus: Sein Wesen und seine Entstehung* (Vienna: K. k. Zentral-Kommission für Kunst- und Historische Denkmale and Braumüller, 1903), available in English as “The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Its Origins,” trans. Kurt W. Forster and Diane Ghirardo, *Oppositions* 25 (1982): 20–51.

10. See, for example, Margaret Olin, “The Cult of Monuments as a State Religion in Late 19th Century Austria,” *Wiener Jahrbuch für Kunstgeschichte* 38 (1985): 192.

11. During Habsburg times this ministry’s name was first truncated to the education-only “Unterrichtsministerium” and then renamed “Bildungsministerium.” A parallel construction is found in Denmark before 1916, and in the German Empire and postwar eras, with several German states still naming their education departments “Kultusministerium.”

12. Alois Riegl, “Zur Frage der Restaurierung von Wandmalereien,” *Mitteilungen der k. k. Zentral-Kommission für Erforschung und Erhaltung der Kunst- und historischen Denkmale*, ser. 3, vol. 2 (1903): 14–31, forthcoming in English as “On the Question of the Restoration of Wall Paintings,” trans. Max Koss, in *W86th: A Journal of Decorative Arts, Design History, and Material Culture* 27, no. 2 (Fall 2020).

13. Alois Riegl, *Das Holländische Gruppenporträt* (1902; Vienna: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1931), available in English as *The Group Portraiture of Holland*.

14. If Riegl sometimes appears “an armchair scholar” who spent more time looking at photographs of works of art than at works themselves, we are, far from excusing his occasional provincialism, all the more interested in how his categories reflected those limitations, as well as when they did not. Christopher Wood, “Strzygowski and Riegl in America,” *Journal of Art Historiography*, December 2017, available online at <https://arthistoriography.files.wordpress.com/2017/11/wood.pdf>; and Martin Kemp, “Alois Riegl (1858–1905): Le culte moderne de Riegl,” trans. Olivier Mannoni, in “Histoire et théories de l’art,” special issue, *Revue germanique internationale* 2 (1994): 83–105, available online at <https://journals.openedition.org/rgi/457>.

15. Hugo von Hofmannsthal, *Der Brief des Lord Chandos* (1902; Stuttgart: Reclam, 2019), available in English in *The Lord Chandos Letter and Other Writings*, trans. Joel Rotenberg (New York: NYRB Books, 2005).

16. For Spitzer’s evolving analyses of *Stimmung* as a cosmological concept, see Leo Spitzer, “Milieu and Ambiance: An Essay in Historical Semantics,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 3, no. 2 (December 1942): 169–218; and Leo Spitzer, “Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony: Prolegomena to an Interpretation of the Word ‘Stimmung’” (parts 1 and 2), *Traditio* 2 (1944): 409–64, and *Traditio* 3 (1945): 307–64. A revision of the latter was posthumously published as Leo Spitzer, *Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963). See also Rebecca Pohl’s recent translation of a sweeping review essay by David Wellbery, “*Stimmung*,” *new formations* 93 (February 2017): 6–45. For an innovative treatment of *Stimmung* and related terms from physiological and environmental perspectives, see Margareta Ingrid Christian, “*Aer, Aurae, Venti*: Philology and Physiology in Aby Warburg’s

Dissertation on Botticelli,” *PMLA* 129, no. 3 (2014): 399–416.

17. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (1927; Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2006), 134–40, sec. 29, available in English translation as *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 126–31. Though he does not say so explicitly, Spitzer’s interpretation stands in marked contrast to Heidegger’s pathos-laden conception with its connection to *Furcht* (dread).

18. Rainer Maria Rilke, *Auguste Rodin* (Berlin: Marquardt, 1907), 73–116, available in English in *Rodin and Other Prose Pieces*, trans. G. Craig Houston (London: Quartet Books, 1986), 44–69. The text of Rilke’s Rodin lecture was not reprinted in the 1946 Grey Walls edition of Rilke’s *Rodin*, cited by Rosalind Krauss and other anglophone Rodin scholars. Diana Reynolds Cordileone also sees in Riegl an affiliation with Arthur Schopenhauer, then enjoying the height of his reputation in German and Austrian aesthetic theory, in *Alois Riegl in Vienna 1875–1905: An Institutional Biography* (London: Routledge, 2016), ch. 1.

19. Riegl engaged in more explicit prognostication as well, notably in an unpublished lecture delivered in Prague on 27 January 1897 on the “Future of Artistic Skill.” See “Die Zukunft des Kunsthandwerkes,” in Riegl 14, Box XI, Institutsarchiv des Instituts für Kunstgeschichte, Vienna.

20. Riegl mentions *Stimmungswert* in the seldom-discussed “Bestimmungen zur Durchführung des Denkmalschutzgesetzes” (Provisions for the implementation of the monument protection law) that accompanied the cult essay, itself published as an introduction to the new proposed law. The cult essay contains several mentions of “mood”: “mood-effect” (*Stimmungswirkung*); “a pure mood of age-value” (*eine reine Stimmung des Alterswertes*); the “modern mood-filled” (*modernen Stimmungsmenschen*); a “desire for mood” (*Stimmungsbegehren*); and “mood-filled” or “atmospheric” (*stimmungsvoll*). See Riegl, *Das Moderne Denkmalkultus*. The cult essay, proposed law, and “Bestimmungen” (the latter two the result of a collaboration with Max Bauer) were published without the authors’ names in the same year as *Das Moderne Denkmalkultus*, as *Entwurf einer gesetzlichen Organisation der Denkmalpflege in Österreich* (Vienna: Verlag der Zentral-Kommission für Kunst- und historische Denkmale, 1903). They have been republished as *Kunstwerk oder Denkmal? Alois Riegls Schriften zur Denkmalpflege*, ed. Ernst Bacher (Vienna: Böhlau, 1995), 122–44. See Bacher’s introduction, 13–48; and Martha Fingernagel-Grüll, *Zur Geschichte der österreichischen Denkmalpflege: Die Ära Helfert, Teil II: 1892 bis 1910*, ed. Bundesdenkmalamt Wien, vol. 25, no. 2 of *Studien zu Denkmalschutz und Denkmalpflege* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2020), 70–80 and 561–74.

21. Benjamin, *The Work of Art*, 23.

22. Walter Benjamin, “Little History of Photography” (1931), trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, in *The Work of Art*, 274–98.

23. On Riegl’s own use of photography in argumentation, see Jesse Lockard, “Seeing through a Roman Lens: Formalism, Photography, and the Lost Visual Rhetoric of Riegl’s *Late Roman Art Industry*,” *History of Photography* 40, no. 3 (August 2016): 301–29.

24. Two years after “Mood,” Riegl differentiated his critique of iconography from that of the sculptor Adolf Hildebrand, for whom the “content” of all art was ultimately “architectonic.” Nor did Riegl equip his pluralistic system with a “space value” [*Raumwert?*], something he could easily have done had he thought it salient, despite using the terms *Raumgrund* (spatial ground) and *Raumvorstellung* (spatial idea) in his histories of painting and architecture. Alois Riegl, “Naturwerk und Kunstwerk, II,” *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Munich), Beilage 48 (1901), reprinted in *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 65–70. On space, see Margaret Olin, “Forms of Respect: Alois Riegl’s Concept of Attentiveness,” *Art Bulletin*

71, no. 2 (June 1989): 285–99; and Hans-Georg van Arburg, “Ein sonderbares Gespinst von Raum und Zeit: Zur theoretischen Konstitution und Funktion von ‘Stimmung’ um 1900 bei Alois Riegl und Hugo von Hofmannsthal,” in *Stimmung: Ästhetische Kategorie und künstlerische Praxis*, ed. Kerstin Thomas (Munich: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 2010), 13–30. For the ecological thesis, see Ingrid Christian’s work; and Deborah Coen, “Seeing Planetary Change, Down to the Smallest Wildflower,” in *Climates: Architecture and the Planetary Imaginary* (Zurich: Lars Mueller, 2018), 34–39.

25. On the tactile as opposed to the optic surface, see *Historical Grammar*, 396–98. Riegl uses *tactile* for the literal sense of touch and *haptic* for touch sensations associated with vision (though the term does not occur in the *Historical Grammar* lectures). The term *Haptik* was coined in Max Dessoir’s monograph “on the skin-sense,” “Über den Hautsinn,” *Archiv für Anatomie und Physiologie, Physiologische Abtheilung*, 1892, 242. Dessoir had in mind a general science of touch on the lines of optics and acoustics, with many subfields.

26. See *Historical Grammar*, 278–82.

27. See “The Modern Cult of Monuments,” 51n.

28. For a cogent commentary, see Olin, “The Cult of Monuments,” 177–98.

29. Margaret Lavinia Anderson, “The Limits of Secularization: On the Problem of the Catholic Revival in Nineteenth-Century Germany,” *Historical Journal* 38, no. 3 (September 1995): 647–70.

30. Alois Riegl, *Die Entstehung der Barockkunst in Rom*, ed. Arthur Burda and Max Dvořák (Vienna: Anton Schroll, 1908), 79–88, 100. In the English translation, *Origins*, 152–59.

31. Usually rendered in English as “The state, it is I.” Jürgen Habermas has emphasized this “representative publicness” in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).

32. Commenting on the afterlife of Semper’s “practical aesthetics,” Riegl wrote that “true scientificity was slain by a supposed scientificity. The inevitable result was a vague sense of the inner falsehood of this cult of the isolated fact.” See Alois Riegl, “Naturwerk und Kunstwerk: I,” *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Munich), Beilage 13 (1901), reprinted in *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 51–64.

33. Charles Taylor, “The Future of the Religious Past,” in *Religion: Beyond a Concept* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 178.

34. Josef Bodonyi, *Entstehung und Bedeutung des Goldgrundes in der Spätantiken Bildkomposition* (Ph.D. diss., University of Vienna, 1932), esp. 1–16. Bodonyi was prompted to write his text in refutation of a single footnote in Riegl. When Gombrich reviewed the book, he took Bodonyi’s side, contra Riegl. See Ernst Gombrich, “J. Bodonyi, Entstehung und Bedeutung des Goldgrundes in der spätantiken Bildkomposition,” *Kritische Berichte zur Kunstgeschichtlichen Literatur* 5, no. 3 (1935): 65–75.

35. See Hans Besler, *Das Raumproblem in der altchristlichen Malerei* (Bonn: Schroeder, 1920), 52, where the author denies gold ground any “spatial function” and calls any golden surface a “purely abstract, decorative wall in and of itself” (*rein abstrakte, dekorative Wand an sich*). See also Wood, “Strzygowski and Riegl in America”; and Jaś Elsner, “The Birth of Late Antiquity: Riegl and Strzygowski in 1901,” *Art History* 25, no. 3 (June 2002): 358–79.

36. In *Historical Grammar*, 262, Riegl explains the laying of gold ground as a technique that allows a surface to be “conceived as space.” Merely by beginning to lay this luxuriant, glowing material on a flat plane, the artist produces “a remote and blissful space” and therefore reduces the need for reliance on “further earthly accoutrements.”